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Asymmetric Information and Fragility   






This paper focuses on the financing gap in the South African low-income housing market. 
A model is presented to analyze the effect of asymmetric information on the loan market notably 
lenders’ need to separate low from high-risk African borrowers. In equilibrium the separation 
contract is shown to reduce total loans and the size of loans. In addition, it results in greater 
sensitivity among lenders to factors that might reduce the valuation of collateral (the house) such 
as poor quality construction, inferior infrastructure, crime and corruption. This puts upward 
pressure on the already high cost of loans, which in turn drives out the remaining low risk 






This paper models the impact of asymmetric information on the South African 
financial market. Its purpose is to see how asymmetric information affects the willingness of 
lenders to issue loans and the willingness of borrowers to take out loans. The idea is that 
financing gaps can be found in certain credit markets, notably markets that could potentially 
channel funds to poor people in developing economies. In South Africa the largest such gap 
surely is to be found in the low-income mortgage market. At present the financing gap is 
estimated to be $8.5 billion (R60 billion), which is required to provide homes to the 
approximately 2 million homeless Africans.
1 This paper demonstrates how the presence of 
information asymmetries can cause fragility in the loan market, which in turn can impede the 
flow of credit to low income households.   
The model presented here demonstrates an adverse selection effect in the tradition of 
Akerlof (1970), and follows the more recent models applied to financial markets of Stigliz 
and Weiss (1981) and Bester (1985). George Akerloff in his 1970 article on the “Lemons” 
market shows, using the example of the used car market, how asymmetric information can 
result in market failure. In the market information is asymmetric because the car dealer 
knows the quality of each car whereas the buyer does not. As a result the buyer, in order to 
reduce the likelihood of paying too much for a lemon, will view all cars on the lot as average 
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quality and will only be willing to pay for any car on the lot the price of the average car. 
Given this offer the dealer will take all the above average cars off the lot, reducing the 
average quality of cars and starting the cycle over again. This adverse selection effect can 
cause the market to break down completely. The model here follows Akerloff in suggesting 
that asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection effects. 
More recent  work by  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) extends Akerloff’s analysis and 
demonstrates how adverse selection can take the form of credit rationing in a financial 
market. Stiglitz and Weiss assume that bad or high risk borrowers have a low degree of risk 
aversion r elative to good or low risk borrowers hence as the proportion of bad to good 
borrowers increases the average degree of risk aversion will decline. The fall in the average 
degree of risk aversion can lead to credit rationing. Credit rationing occurs if the interest rate 
reaches or exceeds a critical level at which the probability of default, associated with 
borrowers of higher risk on account that they are willing to pay higher interest rates, is such 
that expected returns to the bank decline. To prevent a decline in expected returns the bank 
will ration credit above a critical interest rate. 
Bester (1985) counters this credit rationing story by arguing that under conditions of 
asymmetric information, a lender can screen out high risk borrowers by inserting collateral 
as part of the loan contract, thereby eliminating the credit rationing problem altogether. He 
demonstrates this by taking the case of a firm that requires a fixed amount of money for an 
investment, I, and that has an initial endowment of wealth,  W, where,  I W < . The firm 
finances the investment by taking out a loan equal in size to the difference between wealth 
and investment,  W I - . Given loan size the bank specifies a loan contract, comprised of r, 
the interest rate, and C, the collateral. According to Bester a high risk borrower (who has a 
high probability of default) when offered the loan package would only accept offers with a 
high interest rate and low collateral.
2 Credit rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss case would 
not occur because if a high risk borrower does not get the loan contract she prefers she can 
always apply for a loan contract chosen by less risky borrowers. Bester than goes on to 
demonstrate that in equilibrium not all borrows will receive the same contract because under 
competition “… there exists another credit offer that is profitable because it attracts only the 
good risks from the pooling contract.” That is, another lender can offer a contract with high 
collateral that high risk borrowers will not accept. 
The model here basically combines Akerloff’s adverse selection story with Stiglitz and 
Weiss and Bester. It demonstrates that under asymmetric information collateral will 
eliminate the Stiglitz and Weiss credit rationing problem but Akerloff’s adverse selection 
effect will still prevail because collateral, as used by Bester, is a much less effective a 
screening device. The reason is that, unlike Bester, borrowers are able to choose the loan size 
after choosing the offer of a loan contract comprised of an interest rate and collateral. Here 
the amount of collateral paid by the borrower is specified by the lender in the form of a 
downpayment rate, which permits high risk borrowers to reduce the collateral by reducing 
loan size. For this reason banks must offer all borrowers a very high rate of downpayment, 
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high enough so that high risk borrowers cannot compensate by reducing loan size. It is this 
very high rate of downpayment that creates a type of fragility similer to Akerloff’s adverse 
selection, w hereby some low risk borrowers get squeezed out with the very high 
downpayment rates. This type of fragility leads not only to fewer loans but also a reduction 
in loan size.   
The experience of lending to low income African’s in the South African township of 
Alexandra will be used to demonstrate how this type of fragility can cause the loan market to 
collapse altogether. Lender’s need to screen out high risk borrowers with variable loan size, 
can have particularly dire consequences for South African communities where the demand 
for houses is greatest, and where crime, corruption and degradation are rampant. It will be 
shown how this type of fragility can exacerbate the effect of rising interest rates in South 
Africa on lending to low income households. 
The policy implication of the model is straightforward: collateral valuation on the part 
of lenders is especially important in the presence of asymmetric information. This is 
especially important in the situation like South Africa where the government places the 
burden of closing financing gaps on private sector lenders. The argument will be made that 
in order for a sufficient lending to take place, communities must be upgraded and crime 
reduced. The case of mortgage lending in the South African township of Alexandra during 
the last years of apartheid, will be given to demonstrate how asymmetric information could 
heighten lender’s sensitivity to poor quality construction, corruption and crime causing a 
break down in the housing loan market altogether. 
This paper will proceed as follows. First, a model of the low-income housing market 
will be presented and the equilibrium loan contract derived under symmetric information. 
Second, the assumption of complete information will be dropped and the new equilibrium 
loan contract derived. It will be demonstrated that under asymmetric information fewer loans 
are given and loans that are taken out are smaller in size. Third, a case will be made for the 
existence of asymmetric information in the low-income mortgage market in South Africa. A 
case study of the mortgage lending in the South African township, Alexandra, will be 
presented to demonstrate how increased fragility, due to asymmetric information, could 
exacerbate the problem of lending in communities characterized with high crime and 
corruption and rising interest rates. The presence of fragility combined with crime and 
corruption and rising interest rates could lead to a swift and severe collapse of the loan 
market.   
 
II. The Model  
 
The model here demonstrates how asymmetric information can lead to fragility of the 
loan market. Unlike Bester, where credit rationing is reduced entirely because lenders can 
offer a range of contracts where high and low risk borrowers self-select themselves and the 
bank does not lose money, the self-selection mechanism does not work as efficiently. For 
this reason a type of adverse selection does prevail. Unlike Akerloff, however, the market 
will not necessarily break down but instead will become increasingly fragile. Increased 
fragility of the market, in turn can be seen to exacerbate the negative effects of declining JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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collateral valuation due to external factors like rising crime, corruption and poverty (that 
often characterize communities in developing countries) and rising deposit rates. 
The behavior of two types of borrowers is modeled here, low risk and high risk. Each 
borrower faces a good state and a bad state. A good state occurs when the borrower does not 
default on the loan and a bad state occurs when the borrower defaults on the loan. The 
probability of a good state happening,  ) , ( H L i p
i = , is greater for the low risk borrower than 
for the high-risk borrower, and 
H L p p > . The probability of a bad state,  ) 1 (
i p - , is greater 
for a high-risk borrower than for the low risk borrower, and  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
H L p p - < - . Probabilities 
are exogenous and there is no moral hazard.   
Each borrower faces an expected utility function:   
 
) ( ) 1 ( )) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( D F p D F L r H V R p U
i i i - - - + - + = , 
 
where  R  is income from employment and  H  is house size in money terms.  H  is the 
collateral and will be repossessed by the lender in the case of default.  L D H + = , where  L 
= loan size and  D  is that portion of the house the borrower actually owns.   
) (H V  is the utility the borrower expects to get from the house and  ) (D F  is the 
disutility of having to make the down payment,  D . In a good state the borrower will receive 
satisfaction from the income and from the house, and will lose satisfaction from paying back 
the loan plus principle, and from making a downpayment. In a bad state the borrower will 
default and the bank will repossess the house. Although the borrower no longer suffers from 
having to pay back the loan, she loses that portion of the house that she owns, the 
downpayment. As in Bester, the point that a borrower will lose the downpayment or 
collateral should she default, is necessary to insure a separation equilibrium.   
The first and second derivatives of  ) (H V   and  ) (D F  are the following:   
 
0 ) ( > ¢ H V ,  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ H V ,  0 ) ( > ¢ D F ,  0 ) ( > ¢ ¢ D F  
 
The utility from owning a house,  ) (H V , increases but at a diminishing rate as house size 
increases. The disutility from having to make a downpayment,  ) (D F , increases but at an 
increasing rate as the size of the downpaym ent arises.
3 This is an important result because it 
means that the borrower will actually participate in the loan market as opposed to paying for 
the entire house with a downpayment. 
 
3. This is a reasonable because having to make a down payment is likely to entail a substantial inconvenience 
especially among poor households. For instance, poor households are less likely to have sufficient savings (or any 
savings at all) or friends and relatives with extra savings they could borrow. Accumulating the down payment 
might entail having to borrow funds from a moneylender in the informal sector who charges usurious interest 
rates. Or it might mean the borrower works longer hours to accumulate sufficient funds to cover the down 
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Finally, each borrower has identical income, R, and functions, ) (H V , ) (D F . The only 
difference is the exogenous probability, 
i p . This is important because it means qualitative 
differences between borrowers other than 
i p , have no effect on lending. 
The lender operates in a perfectly competitive market. This forces the lender to offer 
the best contract and eliminates the possibility of making a profit. There are no externalities 
or discrimination and loans earn a market rate of return. The lender’s expected profit 
function is the following:   
 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( = + - - + + = L kH p L r p E
i i i q p , 
 
where  k is the lender’s valuation of the collateral,  H. This includes any transaction or 
liquidation cost that might be incurred when the lender repossesses the house and  1 0 < < k . 
L r) 1 ( +  is the interest and principle that the lender receives from the borrower and 
L ) 1 ( q +  is the bank’s marginal cost of funds.   
If we take the profit equation and replace H with  L D+  and divide through by L, we 
can rewrite the profit equation as: 
 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( = + - + - + + = q a p k p r p E
i i , 
 
where  a is the rate of downpayment and 
L
D
= a . The rate of downpayment,  a, is 
specified by the lender who determines the downpayment as a proportion of loan size. The 
lender will offer a set of contracts comprised of an interest rate and downpayment rate 
combination,  ) , 1 (
i i r C a + = , and the borrower will choose the contract that maximizes 
utility after maximizing over loan size.
4 By specifying the downpayment as a proportion of 
loan size, unlike in Bester where loan size is fixed, the borrower can increase or decrease the 
size of the downpayment by changing the size of the loan. In this manner, a high risk 
borrower can reduce the size of the downpayment by choosing a smaller loan size. For this 
reason, collateral in the form of a downpayment is less effective a separation device because 
high risk borrowers can reduce loan size to reduce the required downpayment. Below it will 
be shown that by offering a rate of downpayment as opposed to a fixed collateral the lender 
must offer a very high rate of downpayment to every borrower in order for separation to 
occur. 
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Since  0 >
i p , then  0 < ¢ - ¢ F V p
i . This requires that  F V ¢ < ¢ . This is a very important 
result as it states that the borrower derives a great deal of discomfort making a downpayment. 
If this were not the case and  F V ¢ ‡ ¢  the borrower would pay for the entire loan with a 
downpayment. It is necessary that the borrower dislike making a downpayment in order for 
her to participate in the loan market. Without  F V ¢ < ¢ , there would be no loan market.   
Since 
H L p p > , the indifference curve for the low risk borrower will always be less 
steep than that for the high-risk borrower. The intuition behind this result is that a high-risk 
borrower will only accept an increase in a if she gets a large decline in  r + 1 . This is 
because she has a very low tolerance for collateral because she is more likely to default 
hence more likely to lose the down payment. On the other hand, a low risk borrower would 
accept an increase in a with only a small decline in  r + 1 , because she is unlikely to 
default hence lose the downpayment.   
Finally, the lender must offer a set of contracts attractive enough for the borrowers to 
participate in the market. Each borrower has a reservation utility level. This ensures that the 
lender offer contracts that if accepted by the borrower, makes the borrower better off than if 
she had not participated in the market at all. 
 
III. Equilibrium under Symmetric Information 
 
We can derive equilibrium under conditions of symmetric information. Solving for 
first order conditions,





 substitute  L D a =   to get:
5 
 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = ¢ - + - + ¢ a a F r p V p
i i , 
 
re-arranging to get: 
 
a a F r V p
i ¢ = + - ¢ + )) 1 ( ) 1 (( , 
 
which shows that in equilibrium the borrower in a good state will choose the contract and 
loan size whereby the marginal net benefit  )) 1 ( ( r V + - ¢  she derives from the house is equal 
to the marginal disutility that arises from making a downpayment,  F¢. 
Above it was demonstrated that  F V ¢ < ¢ . We can prove from the first order conditions 
that the low risk borrower will accept any contract offered to the high-risk borrower and will 
take out a bigger loan.
6 This is an important because it is required for the separation 
equilibrium to occur under asymmetric information. This result means that the reservation 
indifference curve for the low risk borrower will never cross the reservation indifference 
curve for the high-risk borrower. 
Graphically, equilibrium under symmetric information is shown in Figure 1. 
 
5. See appendix for first order conditions.   
6. See appendix for proof.   EBERT: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FRAGILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICA 




















Figure 1  Equilibrium under Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information 
 
The lender offers each borrower a range of contracts or contract menu indicated as  0 =
L p  
for the low risk borrower and  0 =
H p  for the high-risk borrower. Each borrower can choose 
whatever contract they want as long as it lies along their respective menu. 
Under symmetric information the lender will offer 
L p  to the low risk borrower and 
H p  to the high-risk borrower. The low risk borrower will choose the downpayment rate and 
interest combination at 
L C  and the high-risk borrower will choose the contract 
H C . Each 
contract is chosen such that utility is maximized after the borrower has chosen the optimal 
loan size, given  r + 1  and  a. The high-risk borrower will pay a higher interest rate than 
the low risk borrower. However, the low risk borrower may or may not choose a contract 
with a higher downpayment rate than the high-risk borrower.  
 
IV. The Model Under Asymmetric Information 
 
When asymmetric information is introduced the lender is no longer able to distinguish 
between borrower types hence cannot simply offer each borrower the appropriate contract 
menu. If a high-risk borrower is offered the contract meant for the low risk borrower they 
will be better off but the lender will lose money. To participate in the market the lender must 
be able to offer a loan contract that does not cause her to lose money nor make a profit. 
Strategically, the lender could offer three different contracts: a. pooled contract, b. high risk 
contract or c. low risk contract. We can prove that a pooled contract and a contract offered 
only to high-risk borrowers will result in an unstable equilibrium.
7  The only solution is for 
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the lender to offer a single contract to the low risk borrower, which will work to separate out 
low from high-risk borrowers. 
The only way for the lender to participate in the market is to offer a contract to the low 
risk borrower alone. This result differs from Bester in that in equilibrium both high risk and 
low risk borrowers are offered and would accept contracts with low interest and high 
collateral and high interest and low collateral, respectively. Here it is not possible to offer the 
high risk borrower a separate contract because a low risk borrower will accept any contract 
offered to a high risk borrower and a “skimming the cream” effect will occur (see appendix 
for proof). The only contract that results in stable equilibrium is a contract that meets the 
following conditions.   
 
) ( )) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( ( L F r L V p
S S S H a a < + - + , for any 
* L , and 
 
0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( = + - - + + = L H k p L r p E
L L L q p . 
 
The first equation insures that if a high-risk borrower were to choose the contract she would 
derive less net benefit from living in the house than the disutility from having to make the 
down payment. This insures that she will not choose the contract. The second equation 
insures that the contract will earn the lender zero profits. 
A set of contracts exists that meet these requirements. In Figure 1 this set of contracts 
that could potentially separate lie to the right of the high risk borrower’s reservation utility 
function, 
RH U , and to the left of the low risk borrower’s reservation utility curve, 
RL U . All 
contracts to the right of the high risk borrower’s reservation utility that are offered to a high 
risk borrower will not be accepted because she would be better off not participating in the 
loan market at all. The only borrower who would accept the contract - as long as it was to the 
left of the curve 
RL U   - would have to be low risk because they would still derive more 
satisfaction from participating in the market than from not participating at all.   
Hence to separate out high from low risk borrowers the lender will offer every 
borrower a single contract, 
S C
 as shown in Figure 1.
8 If an individual accepts the loan she 
signals herself as a low-risk borrower. If she rejects the loan she signals herself as a high risk 
borrower and we have got successful separation. 
In this model lenders must offer a contract with a very high downpayment rate such 
that high risk borrowers even after reducing loan size are still faced with a downpayment 
high enough to discourage them from accepting the contract. In other words, 
) ( )) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( ( L F r L V p
S S S H a a < + - +   for any 
* L  Unlike Bester, banks can continue to raise 
interest rates and collateral rates, to prevent a fall in the rate of return while lending to any 
borrower. 
 
8. Note that 
S C  is preferable to any other contracts lying along  0 =
L p  between 
HR U  and 
LR U . At any other 
contract along  0 =
L p , the lender will not make a profit, however competitors could enter the market and offer a 
lower rate of downpayment (not less than 
S a ) and skim the cream. Thus, competition forces the lender to offer 
the best separation contract at 
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The separation contract, 
S C , is a source of fragility in the loan market due to the high 
downpayment rate required for separation. This fragility leads to two problems. First, it 
pushes out high risk borrowers entirely from the market. Second, it imposes an additional 
cost to the low risk borrower because she must pay a much higher downpayment than she 
would under symmetric information. For a given set of parameter this results is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table1   Comparison of Loan Size under Symmetric Information   
with Loan Size with Separation Equilibrium 











* = L   137 .
* = a   05 . 1 1
* = +r   11






L L   002 .
* =
L a   08 . 1 1
* = +
L r   30
* = U  
Parameters: 5 = a ,  2 . = b ,  10 = c ,  9 . = k ,  05 . = q ,  8 . =
L p  
 
The low risk borrower faces a much higher rate of downpayment than offered in a contract 
when information is complete. Although low risk borrowers do not mind making a 
downpayment, if it is too high they will choose to reduce loan size to compensate for the loss 
of utility from having to make a high downpayment. For a given set of parameters, it can be 
shown that the borrower takes out a smaller loan size under asymmetric information. In 
Table 1 loan size falls from 20 thousand to 6 thousand when the lender offers a separation 
contract. 
Below an argument will be m ade that fragility in the loan market due to asymmetric 
information can impose additional hardship on low income South African households 
seeking mortgages as high risk borrowers are completely denied loans and low risk 
borrowers to receive loans must pay a very high rate of downpayment. In addition, the need 
to separate imposes additional fragility because due to the already high collateral as a 
proportion of loan size, lenders could be especially sensitive to external factors that could be 
seen to reduce the value of collateral. This is particularly important in the case of South 
African townships which for generations have been deprived of adequate resources, and 
which today face rising crime, corruption and ongoing degradation.   
 
V. Asymmetric Information in South African   
 
South Africa provides an interesting case study on the presence of asymmetric 
information and its potential impact on the flow of credit to prospective borrowers. Above a 
model was presented to show how the presence of asymmetric information could impede the 
flow of credit to borrowers. Here the example of the financing gap in the South African 
low-income mortgage market will be considered. 
First, it is important to point out three characteristics of the post-apartheid economy 
that could be seen to exacerbate the asymmetric information problem, a problem that exists JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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to some degree in any financial sector (Stigliz and Jaffee (1990)). First is the insufficient or 
lack of credit information for the bulk of the African population, most notably Africans most 
in need of housing loans. There are two reasons for this. First, during apartheid many 
Africans engaged in organized bond strikes to protest against the apartheid system 
(Mayakiso (1997)). Those who participated in the boycotts incurred poor marks on their 
credit records when such credit reports existed. Although boycotts are seen today as 
legitimate forms of protest lenders still face a lack of accurate records. Second, most 
Africans especially those living in rural areas have never had credit records. This is due to a 
lack of credit recording bureaus and simply because many Africans never had contact with 
the formal financial market.   
The second characteristic that can be seen to exacerbate the information problem in 
South Africa is the extreme social, economic and cultural differences that exist between 
whites and blacks that arose historically under the apartheid cultivation of separate 
development. Apartheid worked to foster the economic development of whites at the expense 
of the vast m ajority of blacks, many of which today are without houses, hence in the loan 
market whites are generally the lenders and blacks the low-income borrowers. Cultural, 
social and economic differences, why historical still exist a great deal today, could effect the 
lending decision on the part of whites and the willingness of blacks to participate in the 
market, given that financial markets depend a great deal on mutual familiarity and trust for 
their operation. 
The third characteristic of post-apartheid South Africa is the emergence of a group of 
“high-risk” borrowers associated with rising crime and violence. Although crime and 
violence create a great deal of unease for all South Africans, it is most devastating in those 
areas where homelessness and poverty prevail, such as crowded townships like Soweto and 
new urban ghettos like Hilbrow in downtown Johannesburg. Faced with a rising crime in 
townships and communities that were once primarily white, lenders might find it more 
difficult to distinguish low from high-risk blacks when considering a mortgage loan 
application.
9 
These three characteristics, lack of credit records for Africans, historical unfamiliarity 
and mistrust, and high crime and violence, could exacerbate the asymmetric information 
problem in South African. As was discussed above information asymmetries are exacerbated 
by lenders inability to differentiate between black borrowers, which in turn can cause fewer 
loans supplied, smaller loan sizes and increased fragility of the financial market. 
 
VI. Fragility in the Mortgage Market in Alexandra Township (1989 - 1992) 
 
By the late 1980s and the end of formal apartheid a wave of community activism 
occurred focused on improvements in the living conditions of the millions of previously 
disadvantaged African households. Activists, who had previously invested energy into 
fighting against the apartheid regime, took on the challenge to reduce the tremendous 
housing shortage amongst the primarily poor African population. Given the amount of 
 
9. Paradoxically, much of the violence might be reduced if homelessness were eradicated. EBERT: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FRAGILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICA 
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financial resources required to build the estimated 2 million units, activists sought to draw on 
resources from private lenders, notably white upper class South Africans.
10 Although 
opening channels to facilitate the flow of credit from rich white bankers to poor Africans was 
-  and remains today - a huge challenge, by 1986 banks responded positively to activist 
demands for increased mortgage lending to households in Alexandra (Mayekiso (1997)). 
Between 1986 and 1990 about Rand 7 billion in mortgages (or bonds) were issued to 
residents of Alexandra (Mayekiso  (1997)). The bonds were issued to the wealthiest 
households, those who could be thought of as low risk as they were willing to accept the 
contracts offered by the white lenders. The smallest size bond issued was about R35,000 
(sufficient to cover the cost of a minimally decent house estimated at R30,000 (Bond (1997), 
Mayekiso (1997))). Despite the limited clientele  - an outcome of the lenders attempt to 
separate out high risk borrowers - this was a great achievement indeed and was a positive 
indication that banks could lend mortgages successfully to African households living in 
townships. 
However, by about 1990 the fragility of the mortgage market became clear. The 
fragility of the loan market, due to lender’s need to screen out high-risk borrowers, could be 
seen to have exacerbated the impact of external factors on the performance of the loan 
market. A number of events are responsible for this reversal in bank lending preferences. The 
first problem that occurred was the poor quality of housing construction (Mayekiso (1997)). 
Out of all township houses built by private developers by the late 1980s about 90 percent had 
cracks and other serious structural defects. Promises made to develop communities, churches, 
shops, etc. never materialized and many township houses went without electricity hook-ups 
for years (Mayekiso (1997)). Poor quality construction had the effect of reducing the value of 
houses as collateral on mortgage loans.   
Second, along with poor construction corruption was prevalent. It is known that in 
some cases corrupt agents in the real-estate market conned banks into issuing second bonds 
to households when the household knew nothing about it. This worked to cheat homeowners 
out of building even better homes since the second loan was not used to for building 
purposes. In addition, to the reduction in value of houses already built banks now lost out on 
the collateral in the form of houses which were never built.   
Third, another factor was the difficulty that banks had in a ctually attaining the 
collateral should the household default. Although estimates of arrears on housing loans were 
as high as 30 percent, townships continued to support the rights of black families to remain 
in houses even when they could no longer afford to pay (Mayekiso (1997)). This made it 
difficult for the banks to evict tenants and to gain access to the collateral (the house). 
A final factor that contributed to the breakdown in the low-income housing market in 
Alexandra is the rise in interest rates. Initially, bonds were initially issued at 12.5 percent but 
 
10. At this time there was a strong sense that the transition government was committed to moving away from the 
apartheid era interventionist regime (characterized with high levels of government spending on the economy) 
towards a pro-market regime. Hence targeting private lenders was an obvious outcome.   JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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between 1988 and 1989 they soared more than 8 percent.
11  In this environment, 
characterized with falling house values, banks, which previously were politically and socially 
motivated to lend to low income Africans began to redline African residential areas such as 
Alexandra because they believed that “the value of the house (the bank’s security) would 
decline” (Mayekiso (1997, p. 176)).
12 
The first three factors, poor construction, corruption and difficulty in collecting 
collateral after default, could be seen to reduce the lender’s valuation of collateral,  k . The 
lender’s valuation of collateral would fall due to the perception that houses were worth less 
on account of bad construction, moral hazard associated with corruption, and the perception 
that transactions costs associated with the difficulty of collecting collateral had risen. Finally, 
the rising deposit rate banks were confronted with at the end of the 1980s, can be seen to put 
upward pressure on already high interest rates. 
The fall in the lender’s valuation of collateral as a result of these factors would have 
the effect shown in Figure 2. A fall in k would cause a rotation in the contract menu, from 
0
1 =
L p  to  0
2 =
L p . This moves the separation contract from 
1 S C  to 
2 S C , where the 
interest rate demanded in the latter is higher than in the former. This rise in the interest rate 
further squeezes out low risk borrowers who would prefer to pay high collateral in exchange 



















Figure 2  The Effect of Falling k on the Loan Contract under Asymmetric Information 
 
 
11. By the end of 1988 the bank rate was 14.50 and rose to 18.00 by the end of 1989 (South African Reserve Bank 
Quarterly Bulletin (March 1998)). 
12. As mentioned above this exacerbated the problem even more because houses could only be sold to someone 
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The fall in k and subsequent move from 
1 S C  to 
2 S C  has resulted in a decline in utility for 
the low risk borrower from  1 U  to  2 U . The loss in utility works to squeeze out some low 
risk borrowers and cause those who do participate to take out smaller loans. Finally, the 
model demonstrates how the rise in the bank rate can compound the problem of rising 
interest rates in an already fragile environment. The rise in the deposit rate,  q, compounded 
the rise in the lending rate caused by rising k, as lenders were forced to match the rising bank 
rate after 1988. 
 
VII. Policy Implications of Model 
 
The policy implications of the model are as follows. First, the discussion above shows 
the importance of enforcing default and repossession. If banks were uncertain whether they 
would be able to repossess homes in the case of default it seems likely they would not lend. 
This is what appears to have happened in Alexandra. 
Second, it points to the importance of strengthening the secondary market in homes. 
Households that cannot afford payments (due to rising interest rates) could avoid default and 
repossession if it were possible to sell the house in a secondary market.   
Third, this case has shown the importance of the state’s role in reducing the moral 
hazard of poor construction by providing sufficient housing inspection. If the state itself is 
prone to corruption in the administration of such standards it might be beneficial to set up an 
independent monitoring system to support the housing market.   
Finally, the fourth policy implication is the strong complementarity between basic 
services such as sanitation, water, power and roads, and housing delivery. Local and 
provincial government could play a role here by investing in residential infrastructure and 




This paper has developed a model of the mortgage market to analyze the impact of 
asymmetric information on the lending decision among lenders and borrowers. Three 
characteristics of the South African economy were given that could be seen as a source of 
asymmetric information. First, was the lack of credit records among the African population, 
second, was the historical unfamiliarity and mistrust between whites, primarily the lenders, 
and blacks, primarily low income households and finally the third factor seen to exacerbate 
the information problem was high, and rising, crime. These factors combined with already 
poor infrastructure and institutional development can be seen to exacerbate the problem of 
incomplete information. 
The model presented here works as a foundation to policy makers who are interested 
in social investment in housing markets. A number of policy implications were discussed 
based on the example of the low income mortgage in the township Alexandra. In particular, 
the policy implication of a falling  k  was pointed out, which included the enforcement of 
default and repossession efforts, the importance of a secondary market in homes, the need to 
insure high construction standards and to reduce moral hazard problems, and the strong 
complementarity between basic services and housing delivery. In order to resolve its housing JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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crises, in fragile loan markets, South Africa must focus not only on incentives to lenders but 
on upgrading communities, infrastructure and fighting crime. Unfortunately, the magnitude 







Appendix A  ( footnote 3) 
 
We can solve for the first order conditions. These are as follows. 
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Appendix B   ( footnote 4) 
 
The proof is as follows. In equilibrium we get:   
 
i i i i F r V p a a ¢ = + - ¢ + )) 1 ( ) 1 (( .
 
 
Since  F V ¢ < ¢ ,  0 1 < ¢ - + V r  or  0 1 > + - ¢ r V , and  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > + - ¢ + r V a . And since 
H L p p >   or  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
L H p p - > -  for a given loan level: 
 
)) 1 ( ) 1 (( )) 1 ( ) 1 (( r V p r V p
H L + - ¢ + > + - ¢ + a a  and  a a F r V p
L ¢ > + - ¢ + )) 1 ( ) 1 (( . 
 
Thus in order to reduce the left-hand side of each equation the low risk borrower must take 
out a larger loan size. This will reduce  V¢  and raise  F¢ until  a a F r V p
L ¢ = + - ¢ + )) 1 ( ) 1 (( . 
This proves that at any downpayment - interest rate combination, the low risk borrower will 
choose a larger loan size than the high-risk borrower. It is also possible for a given set of EBERT: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FRAGILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICA 
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parameters that 
H p  is so low that the high-risk borrower’s zero profit line,  0 =
H p , sits 
above and to the right of the reservation utility. In this case, the high-risk borrower would 




Faced with incomplete information the lender could offer all borrowers a pooled contract 
found along the contract menu:   
 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( = + - - + + = L kH p L r p E
P P P q p , 
 
where 
H L P p p p ) 1 ( l l - + =   and  = l the proportion of low-risk borrowers in the 
population. However, since the indifference curve of the low risk borrower, 
L U , is less 
steep than that of the high-risk borrower, 
H U (as shown in section 1) we get a single 
crossing property hence a competitor could enter the market and “skim the cream” 
(Rothchilds and Stigliz (1981)). 
The lender could also offer a single contract meant only for the high-risk borrower. 
However, it was shown above that the low risk borrower will always accept a contract meant 
for the high risk borrower (and take out a bigger loan), hence once again we get a skimming 
the cream effect. Competitors can enter the market and offer a better contract to the low risk 
that the high risk will not choose. The proof is as follows. Take a single contract 
) , 1 (
H H H r C a + =  offered by the lender and accepted by a high-risk borrower. Referring to 
first order conditions, the borrowers net benefit will be equal to the disutility from making a 
down payment. We can see this from:   
 
) ( )) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( ( L F r L V p
H H H H a a = + - + . 
 
If the low risk borrower accepts this contract we get: 
   
)) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( ( )) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( (
H H H H H L r L V p r L V p + - + > + - + a a , 
 
since 
H L p p >
 this means that  
 
) ( )) 1 ( ) ) 1 (( ( L F r L V p
H H H L a a > + - + . 
 
Therefore, the low risk borrower will end up taking out a larger loan size at 
H C  because 
she derives a greater net benefit than the loss in utility from making a down payment. Thus 
the low-risk borrower will also accept any contract offered to the high-risk borrower and take 
out a larger loan size. In addition, at 
H C
 the lender will make a profit because this contract 
lies above the contract menu of the low risk borrower;  0 =
L p . However, positive profit 
mean that competitors will enter the market and offer the low risk borrower a better contract, 
anywhere to the right of the high-risk borrower’s indifference curve. In this manner, once JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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again we get a skimming the cream effect and the equilibrium breaks down. A high-risk 
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